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This thesis presents a synopsis of the overall system that
determines scheduled maintenance requirements for Navy
aircraft. The history of the development of the logic
process now used to determine scheduled maintenance
requirements is reviewed to show what changes have occurred,
and why the changes were necessary.
Current processes for determining maintenance
requirements are reviewed in some detail to promote
understanding of how the logic system works, and how it
interacts with the design process.
Major system acquisition and logistic support analysis
processes are briefly summarized to highlight the location of
the maintenance requirements determination procedures within
the total system
-
Comparisons are made and differences are noted between
the U.S. Air Force procedures for maintenance program
development and those of the Navy.
Potential problems with the new system of statistical
sampling based depot maintenance are noted, and possible
future developments in the field are discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE EVOLUTION OF AIRCRAFT DESIGN AND MAINTENANCE
The evolution of aircraft design has been rapid since its
origin in 1903, and this is especially true for the period
subsequent to World War II up to 1984. Aircraft have
increased in complexity, sophistication, and redundancy, with
each generation.
Maintenance requirements and procedures have also grown
in sophistication and complexity with time in order to keep
aircraft operating safely and efficiently.
The evolution of aircraft design has been along several
lines, including commercial, military, and private aviation.
Maintenance procedures, programs, and philosophies have also
varied as the field of aviation has grown. The result of
this continued growth is the ever broadening and ever more
complex field of aircraft maintenance existing in 1984. This
field now requires knowledge and skills comparable to those
required to design an aircraft.
B. INTENT OF THE THESIS
The current knowledge base for effective aircraft
maintenance results from background and knowledge of
successes and failures of the past, emerging technologies and
13
maintenance practices of the present, and potential
maintenance needs and performance requirements of the future.
This report summarizes parts of the current knowledge
base pertinent to military aircraft maintenance programs.
Many people in the field of aviation are not aware of the
depth and breadth of the analytical effort that goes into
arriving at a scheduled maintenance program. Many are also
not aware of the reasons behind the changes leading to the
current practices for determining scheduled maintaining
requirements. To improve the level of understanding of
people inside and outside the field of aviation, previous
practices and the history of the development of the current
process are reviewed to show why and how changes occurred.
It is hoped that this report will serve as an
introduction for people interested in but not familiar with
the subject area, allowing them to understand terminology and
the basis of the logical process behind scheduled maintenance
programs. It is also intended that the report will provide,
the person with experience in any of the disciplines involved
with maintenance programs (engineering design, logistics,
program cost analysis, etc.) a better understanding of the




C. THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC FACTORS ON MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS
A major factor driving the development of the current
procedures for determining scheduled maintenance requirements
has been economic pressure. As equipment becomes more
complex, it can also become more expensive to maintain unless
specific steps are taken during the design process to provide
reliability and maintainability. Funding for performing
maintenance has become more scarce over the years as the cost
of procuring new equipment has grown, and available funding
has migrated towards acquisition. The reduction of available
funding has caused all maintenance requirements to be looked
at carefully, and has forced the development of a rigorous
system for justifying these requirements. It has been said
with some validity that the wide bodied commercial jets would
not have been economically feasible to operate under the
maintenance programs in use prior to the development of a
logic system for determining scheduled maintenance
requirements. This statement is at least partially
applicable to military aircraft and the need to reduce
maintenance expenditures for them.
In a statically based sampling inspection program only a
statistically significant percentage of an aircraft fleet is
inspected at the depot to monitor fleet material condition.
The savings resulting from changing to a sampling inspection
program of scheduled depot maintenance are enormous, but
whether or not this change can be made depends upon the
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original design. Sampling based inspection programs are
becoming an economic necessity if funding is to be available
for acquiring new weapon systems as well as maintaining the
old ones, and this in turn requires interaction between the
designer and the maintenance analyst during the design
process. At the same time, readiness and safety must be
maintained at acceptable levels. The current system and
procedures for determining scheduled maintenance requirements
should accomplish these goals.
D. MAJOR TOPICS ADDRESSED
This report provides the reader a synopsis of the history
of aircraft scheduled maintenance practices in general, and
U.S. Navy aircraft scheduled maintenance practices in
particular. The principal events leading up to the current
system of developing a scheduled maintenance program are
noted, and current practices are examined. Major topics
addressed are:
1 . History and Background
The major events in the growth of the field of
scheduled maintenance requirements determination are noted
for the period subsequent to World War II up to 1984. This
information provides the reader with the why and how of the
development of the current system of scheduled maintenance
program requirements determination. By examining the roots
16
of aviation scheduled maintenance programs a clearer
understanding of the current system may be attained.
2. The Acquisition Process
The relationship between the acquisition of a major
aircraft weapon system and the development of its scheduled
maintenance program is examined. The impact of
maintainability, reliability, life cycle costs, and logistics
support analysis requirements on the process are reviewed.
The nature of this relationship is unclear to many people in
the aviation field; however, this area will have significant
impact on the design of all future weapon systems.
3. Reliability-Centered Maintenance
The use of Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM)
analysis logic techniques in the determination of scheduled
maintenance requirements is examined. The details of the
logic are presented for information, and the principles
behind the logic are reviewed. A better understanding of the
methodology used to determine scheduled maintenance
requirements should be useful to everyone in the aviation
field. Many aircraft designers in particular can gain by
better understanding the logic and its potential impact on a
design since it appears likely that RCM will interact with
and impact all future designs.
4. The F/A-18 Scheduled Maintenance Program
Current practices in developing an aircraft
maintenance program are examined as they relate to the F/A-18
17
aircraft now entering full-scale production and fleet
deployment. Operating data for the Navy's newest fighter
aircraft are compared to the data for the F-4 and F-14 to
illustrate the impact of considering maintenance and
logistics requirements early in the design process. The
tremendous expense of a program that requires all aircraft to
pass through a depot facility every few years for disassembly
and inspection is compared to a less expensive statistical
sampling inspection program wherein only a representative
sample is examined each year.
5. Air Force Maintenance Programs
Current United States Air Force practices in aircraft
scheduled maintenance programs are examined to note
differences and similarities relative to Navy practices, and
to speculate on the reasons for the differences.
6. Potential Problems
Major differences between the current system of
scheduled maintenance requirements and previous practices are
reviewed, and advantages and potential problems compared.
The advantages appear to greatly exceed the disadvantages if
reasoned efforts are made to control potential problems.
7. Future Directions for Scheduled Maintenance Programs
A look at probable future developments is included to
identify work still needing to be done in the field and
changes that are likely to occur.
18
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE EARLY YEARS OF AVIATION MAINTENANCE
In the beginnings of aviation, aircraft were relatively
simple machines with very low reliability. Scheduled
maintenance often consisted of essentially rebuilding the
vehicle for each flight. As the sophistication and
complexity of the machines increased, the intervals for
rebuilding the components increased, but the basic
maintenance philosophy remained one of making the equipment
like new to insure adequate reliability and safety in
operation. This philosophy was in effect in one form or
another through World War II.
B. AFTER WORLD WAR II
When commercial aviation started to grow rapidly and
expand the data base available to people responsible for
maintaining the equipment, some individuals began to question
the philosophy of rebuilding or overhauling complicated
equipment as a means of insuring reliability and safety.
With the advent of turbojet aircraft of increased complexity
and redundancy in the 1950s, it became more and more obvious
to some that the concept of overhauling complicated
equipments was of questionable benefit, both economically and
from a safety and reliability standpoint.
19
C. THE FIRST JET TRANSPORTS
Soon after the introduction of the early jet transports
(e.g., DC-8) , studies of failure data on turbojet engines led
to a decision to not overhaul engines on a scheduled basis in
all cases. Failed engines were examined on an individual
basis to see if overhaul was in fact necessary, and in the
majority of cases any indicated repair was accomplished and
the unit returned to service for the remainder of its
operating life CRef. 1; pp. 393.
As operating and failure data on the early jet transports
became available, they provided a basis for deciding that
mandatory overhaul at a set time was in fact not always
desirable for complex equipments, from either an economic or
safety and reliability standpoint. Examination of the family
of curves shown in Figure 1 illustrates this point.
Examination of failure data from all types of aviation
equipments led to the curves shown. For specific equipment
types in each curve, conditional probability of failure is
plotted on the vertical axis against hours of operation since
new or overhauled on the horizontal axis. Figure 1 is
adapted from the landmark report on Reliability-Centered
Maintenance (RCM) prepared for DOD by Nowlan and Heap CRef.
1; pp. 46, Exhibit 2-133.
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Age reliability patterns. In each case the
vertical axis represents the conditional
probability of failure and the horizontal axis
represents operating age since manufacture,
overhaul, or repair. These six curves are
derived from reliability analyses conducted
over a number of years, during which all items
analyzed were found to be characterized by one
or another of the age- reliability relationships
shown. The percentages indicate the percentage
of items studied that establish each of the
basic patterns (United Airlines).
11% MIGHT 4%
BENEFIT FROM






The bathtub curve; infant mortality,
followed first by a constant or
gradually increasing failure
probability and then by a pronounced
wearout" region. An age limit may be
desirable, provided a large number of
units survive to the age at which
wearout begins.
Constant or gradually increasing
failure probability, followed by a
pronounced wearout region. Once again,
an age limit may be desirable (this
curve is characteristic of aircraft
reciprocating engines).
Gradually increasing failure
probability, but with no identifiable
wearout age. It is usually not
desirable to impose an age limit in
such cases (this curve is
characterisitic of aircraft turbine
engines)
.
Low failure probability when the item
is new or just out of the shop,
followed by a quick increase to a
constant level
.




Infant mortality, followed by a
constant or very slowly increasing
failure probability (particularly
applicable to electronic equipment).
FIGURE 1. AGE RELIABILITY PATTERNS
D. FAILURE DATA
Curve A in Figure 1 is the well-known "bathtub" curve
often mentioned by failure analysts as a theoretical "ideal."
This curve is somewhat similar to the kind of plots one gets
from human actuarial data. Breaking the bathtub curve into
significant segments leads to the "infant mortality curve"
demonstrated by the segment from 1 to 2 on Curve A of Figure
1. The infant mortality curve illustrates the phenomenon of
a high initial failure rate (the average number of failures
per hour, or in some cases 1,000 hours) of complex equipment
or human infants. After this initial period during which the
"weaker" units die off at a relatively high rate, the curve
stabilizes to a constant failure rate as shown on Curve A,
segment 2 to 3. This idealized theoretical condition
indicates that in this region of its lifetime the equipment
fails randomly (as a random variable) with no evidence of
deterioration relative to age (time in service). At the end
of this "constant failure rate" segment, in segment 3 to 4
,
the idealized equipment starts to fail at an ever-increasing
rate indicating some form of "wear out." Although the
bathtub curve was originally thought to be indicative of the
performance of all equipment, this didn't turn out be the
case. In their landmark report Nowlan and Heap CRef . 1]
indicate that only four percent of a large group of
equipments studied actually exhibited failure rate
performance close to the idealized bathtub curve.
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Curves B, C, D, E, and F of Figure 1 illustrate the
other types of failure rate performance observed. Of primary
significance when observing these curves is the preponderance
of data showing no definite wear out point. Only six percent
of the data (Curves A and B) indicate the possibility of a
definite wear out point, an additional five percent show an
increasing failure rate (Curve C) , and 89 percent of the data
show no definite wear out point. This is significant because
it provides a basis for the decision not to overhaul
equipments on a fixed time basis unless the failure data
available strongly support the requirement by indicating a
sharp increase in the failure rate at some specific age. As
an example one can see by examining curve F of Figure 1 that
removal of a component of this type from service for overhaul
will only move the component back to the infant mortality
portion of the curve where it has a higher failure rate. In
this case a requirement to overhaul the component would
actually increase the average failure rate as well as
maintenance costs. Studies of the kind represented by the
data in Figure 1 provided the basis for new thinking in the
development of aviation maintenance programs.
E. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MSG-1
As reliability specialists became more knowledgeable
about the failure tendencies and characteristics of the jet
transports in service, time limits between overhauls were
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extended and eventually deleted in the majority of cases for
mechanical and electrical/electronic systems and equipments.
Under the force of economic pressures to reduce maintenance
costs as much as possible while maintaining safety and
readiness at satisfactory levels, reliability specialists in
commercial aviation started looking for ways to formalize the
process of developing aircraft maintenance programs. This
joint effort between the airlines, manufacturers, and the
Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) lead to the formation of the
Maintenance Steering Group (MSG) established in 1967 to
develop a system for determining the maintenance requirements
for the new "jumbo jet", the Boeing 747. The result of this
effort was a systematic methodology for analyzing complex
equipments and determining what scheduled maintenance was
needed, if any, to allow the equipment to achieve its design
level of reliability (reliability is defined as the
probability that a device will perform in a satisfactory
manner for a given period of time when operated under
specified conditions [Ref. 2; pp. 14]). The methodology was
based on the philosophy that maintenance in and of itself
could not improve the level of reliability of complex
equipment beyond its inherent design level. This procedure
was tailored specifically for the 747 and was called MSG-1
CRef . 3] .
MSG-1 was successful in allowing the development of a
scheduled maintenance program that started the 747 in service
24
with eight scheduled removal tasks as compared to the start
of the DC-8 years earlier with 339 scheduled removal tasks
[Ref. 1; pp. 386]. The tremendous conservatism in the
initial requirements for the DC-8 was gradually overcome by
extending the intervals on most of the components and systems
as experience was gained, but this process was quite
expensive as compared to starting with more realistic
intervals, or no removal requirements at all.
F. THE POWER OF MSG -
1
The power of the MSG-1 analysis process when used on a
new design was the rapid feedback from the maintenance
analyst to the designer. For the first time the designer
could be aware of the downstream cost implications
(maintenance and failure implications) of his design
decisions early in the design process when changes are
easiest and least expensive. Working as a design team, the
design engineer and the maintenance analyst could produce an
aircraft that would have not only the desired performance in
terms of speed and range, etc., but one which would also be
as easy to maintain as possible within technology and cost
constraints. For the first time realistic tradeoff studies
could be conducted to study the economic and safety impact of
design alternatives.
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G. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MSG-2
After the success of MSG-1, the joint group continued to
work toward improving the procedures developed, making them
more general and applicable to any aircraft. This effort
lead to the creation of MSG-2 [Ref . 4] for application to the
new wide-body jets, the Lockheed LlOll and Douglas DC-10, in
1970. Application of MSG-2 to the DC-10 resulted in seven
scheduled removal tasks for the initial maintenance program
[Ref. 1; pp. 386]. The procedures of MSG-2 were readily
adaptable to the analysis of most aircraft, and were
subsequently used to revise the scheduled maintenance
programs for other commercial turbojet aircraft. Economic
savings, increased availability, and no reduction in safety
resulted. MSG-2 provided a logical process for analyzing a
piece of equipment in terms of its significance to the
functioning of a system; e.g., a hydraulic pump relative to
the complete hydraulic system, and then to dependent aircraft
functions (flight control system, flaps, landing gear
actuation, braking, steering, etc.).
Significance of the component or system was judged on the
potential impact of its failure. If the failure of the item
had safety implications, a scheduled task was required unless
the equipment would not benefit from the scheduled
maintenance in terms of reduced likelihood of failure. If
scheduled maintenance would not help reduce the consequences
of failure to an acceptable level, redesign was required.
26
Figure 2 CRef. 1; pp. 30, Exhibit 2.2] shows the relative
importance of a failure is tied to the function of the item
in the design.
For the first time maintenance requirements were having a
direct input to the design of the equipment. This
development was in part a recognition of the fact that well
over half of the lifetime cost of owning and operating an
aircraft is tied up in maintenance and operating expenses
(some estimate more than 60 percent of total costs [Ref . 5;
pp. 1-8]). Reducing maintenance costs could significantly
lower the cost of owning and operating a fleet of aircraft.
From this standpoint it can be seen that the potential gain
from application of the procedures is much greater with a new
design where iterations of redesign are more easily
accomplished CRef. 5; pp. 1-7]. For an existing design it is
possible that the cost of applying the procedures would not
be recovered in the remaining life of the aircraft program,
and for this reason the procedures were not applied to some
older aircraft programs.
H. NAVAL AIRCRAFT SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE PROGRAM DEVELOPMENTS
While commercial aviation was making great strides in
reducing maintenance costs in the late 19603 and early 1970s,
military aviation authorities were watching with interest and
attempting to incorporate relevant ideas into their aviation
maintenance system hoping to reduce costs. The Navy lead the
27
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the first and second
failures can be
deferred.
The consequences of a single failure as determined
by the consequences of a possible multiple failure.
A failure that does not in itself affect operating
capability acquires operational consequences if a
subsequent multiple failure would be critical.
FIGURE 2. FAILURE CGNSEOUENCES
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military application of MSG-2, first with the P-3 and S-3
patrol aircraft, and then with the F-4 fighter and the
development of the Analytical Maintenance Program.
1. United Airlines and the P-3 and 5-3
In 1972 and 1973 the Department of Defense (DOD)
contracted with United Airlines (UAL) to apply the MSG-2
logic to the maintenance requirements for the P-3 and S-3
aircraft at the Naval Air Rework Facility, Alameda. This
effort resulted in major changes to the maintenance programs
for the P-3 and S-3.
2. United Airlines and the F-4J
In 1974 the Navy let a contract with UAL to apply
MSG-2 logic and procedures to the maintenance requirements
for the F-4J aircraft at the Naval Air Rework Facility, North
Island. The McDonnell Aircraft Company produced F-4J was at
that time the high performance front line Navy fighter, and
represented quite a change from any previous aircraft
subjected to MSG-2 procedures. This effort was successful in
the sense of accomplishing the task, although the new
scheduled maintenance requirements program did not result in
an immediate major reduction in maintenance costs. However,
subsequent use of the analysis packages developed in this
study allowed the newly MSG-2-procedures-trained engineering
personnel at North Island to gather data and extend scheduled
maintenance intervals for all levels of maintenance,
resulting in considerable savings. As an example, phase
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intervals were increased from 60 flight-hours to 80 and then
100 flight-hours, and Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM)
intervals for the F-4J/S were increased from 36 months to 42
and then 48 months.
3. The Analytical Maintenance Program
The new requirements packages for the F-4 were also
of benefit in that they provided a much more logical and
documented basis for 3ustif ication of aircraft maintenance
expenses to higher levels of authority. After the success of
this project, the MSG-2 procedures were applied to most Navy
aircraft by internal engineering personnel in connection with
the Analytical Maintenance Program (AMP)
.
All of this procedural development resulted in a much
more soundly based maintenance program for Naval aircraft.
With the analysis packages developed using the MSG-2 based
procedures, it became much easier for a new engineer or
technician to become familiar with a system and/or component
and its potential failure modes. This in turn improved the
ability of engineering to monitor the performance of
equipments in service and detect significant changes
indicating a potential problem. It was also of great benefit
in dealing with in-service problems, providing a better basis
for rapidly dealing with the problems that arise with
operating aircraft (temporary restrictions could be more
realistic with a readily available breakdown of failure modes
and the effects of failure nodes)
.
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AMP program analysis was conducted in accordance with
procedures based on MSG-2. NAVAIR 00-25-400 [Ref. 6] was
issued in 1975 and revised in 1978 to provide these
procedures to internal Navy maintenance engineering
personnel
.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RCM AND MSG-3
The AMP and MSG-2 procedures were found wanting in some
areas and improved procedures were developed under the
concept of Reliability-Centered Maintenance <RCM) leading to
the publishing of revised procedures [Ref. 7D in 1981.
Preceding this. United Airlines was commissioned by DOD to
prepare a report CRef . 13 laying out the history of aviation
maintenance developments and giving rise to the new term of
RCM. Reference 1 has a good executive summary of the
development of RCM as an appendix.
On the commercial aviation side, the MSG-2 procedures
were being refined further, resulting in the publishing of
MSG-3 in 1980 CRef. 8]. MSG-3 improved the analysis
procedures for application to aircraft structure.
Nowlan and Heap CRef. 1; pp. 3883 gives a rather
comprehensive statement on RCM philosophy used in thinking
about safety and maintenance requirements. The statement is
worth quoting in part:
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•• Current thinking on the relationship
between safety and scheduled maintenance can thus
be summarized as follows:
-->> Failures are inevitable in complex
equipment and can never be entirely prevented by
scheduled maintenance.
-->> Reliability can usually be dissociated from
safety by the design features of the equipment.
-->> A failure is critical only if loss of the
function in question has a direct adverse effect
on operating safety or if the failure mode that
causes a loss of function also causes critical
secondary damage. Because of this second
condition, an item can have a critical failure
mode even when the loss of its function is not
critical
.
-->> It is possible to design equipment so that
very few of its failures or failure modes will be
critical
-->> In the few cases in which critical failure
modes cannot be overcome by design, on-condition
tasks and safe-life discard tasks can make the
likelihood of a critical failure extremely
remote.
-->> Scheduled overhaul has little or no effect
on the reliability of complex items. Rework
tasks directed at specific failure modes can
reduce the frequency of failures resulting from
those failure modes, but the residual failure
rate will still represent an unacceptable risk.
Consequently scheduled rework is not effective
protection against critical failures.
-->> The technique of RCM analysis explicitly
identifies those scheduled tasks which are
essential either to prevent critical failures or
to protect against the possible consequences of a
hidden failure.
-->> Scheduled-maintenance tasks that do not
relate to critical failures have no impact on
operating safety. They do have an impact on
operating costs, and their effectiveness must
therefore be evaluated entirely in economic
terms."
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J. OTHER APPLICATIONS FOR RCM
It should be noted that DOD also looked Into the
application of RCM principles to other equipments. Navy
ships and Army tanks are among the equipments that have been
subjected to the analysis to insure that all scheduled
maintenance requirements are justified. Grumman Aerospace
Corporation conducted a DOD sponsored (Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense MRA&L) study in 1982 to determine the
progress made in the application of RCM analysis procedures
to all types of equipment. The report resulting from this
study CRef . 9] indicates that all services have had good
success with the application of RCM logic to various types of
equipment, and that expansion of the applications is
continuing.
K. LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND 0MB CIRCULAR NO. A-109
While these developments were taking place in the area of
scheduled maintenance programs, the entire area of logistic
support was being overhauled to develop a more unified and
effective system. In 1970 the President appointed a
commission to investigate the government acquisition system.
The 1972 report of the Commission on Government Procurement
recommended basic changes to improve the procurement process
for major systems. As a result of this report, the Office of
Management and Budget (0MB) published Circular No. A-109
CRef. 10]. Circular A-109 addressed many areas in the
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procurement process, and it will be examined in more detail
later. The primary effect on maintenance programs for new
acquisitions was a requirement to consider Life Cycle Costs
(LCC) and to "Ensure appropriate trade-off among investment
costs, ownership costs, schedules, and performance
characteristics." [Ref., pp. 4; para. 7.c]. Part of the
purpose of this effort was a system of logistics support that
would start with the original conception of a new system and
work interactively to provide the best possible system (in
terms of performance and supportability) within whatever
constraints (such as LCC) were applicable. The result of
this process was the current system of Integrated Logistics
Support (ILS) which will be examined in the next section.
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III. CURRENT PRACTICES
A. INTRODUCTION TO SECTION III
The current system for developing the scheduled
maintenance program for a new aircraft is complex and
thorough. The scheduled maintenance requirements are
developed as a subset of performing a Logistics Support
Analysis (LSA) as required in the acquisition of a new weapon
system. While performing the LSA, there are many iterations
of tradeoff studies to optimize selected parameters while
arriving at the best compromise between all of the competing
elements. In this section the position of the maintenance
requirements determination process is established in the
overall scheme of things in the procurement of a new weapon
system
.
B. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
The current set of procedures and regulations governing
the acquisition of a new weapon system in the Department of
Defense (DOD) is quite elaborate, and only major items will
be summarized here. The procedures have been in a continuous
state of flux since the Presidential Commission on Government
Procurement submitted its report in 1972, and the Office of
Management and Budget (0MB) issued Circular No. A-109 CRef.
103 in 1976.
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Circular No. A-109 directed all agencies, including DOD,
to follow certain procedures in the acquisition process for a
"major system." Major status for a system is assigned based
on cost ceilings for the various acquisition phases. The
prime requirement of A-109 was that the agency (such as DOD)
should rely more heavily on competition to reduce costs in
the acquisition process. Another requirement was that the
agency should state the requirements for a new system in
terms of a need, and not in terms of hardware; e.g.,
something is needed to counter a new threat, rather than we
need a new aircraft of such and so dimensions and performance
capabilities. The intent of this last requirement was to
foster innovation on the part of the competitors from
industry, and encourage open thinking in identifying
solutions to the stated mission needs. A-109 also emphasized
the need for independent cost estimating and establishing
managerial systems to control the acquisition process without
strangling it in paperwork. Consideration of Life Cycle Cost
(LCC) was also stressed.
Current DOD Instructions strongly reflect the guidance of
A-109. The governing instructions for the acquisition of a
major system, such as an aircraft, state emphatically that
resources to achieve readiness shall be given equal weight
with all other requirements, and that competition shall be
used to minimize LCC CRef. 11; pp. 23. Department of Defense
Instructions 5000.2 [Ref. 12] and 5000.39 CRef. 13] are the
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other basic acquisition process instructions. Figure 3 CRef
.
14; pp. 19, Figure 2] illustrates the overall system life
cycle. The following is a breakout of the various phases in
the acquisition process.
1 . Initiation and the Concept Exploration Phase
The procurement of a new system normally starts with
the Identification of a mission need. The need might be
based on a requirement to counter a new threat from a
potential enemy, on the possibility of using new technology
to gain a strategic advantage, or on the potential of
accomplishing a needed expansion of existing capabilities in
a cost beneficial way. In DOD the piece of paper used to
start this process is a Justification for Major System New
Start ( JMSNS) . The JMSNS is submitted with the Program
Objectives Memorandum (POM) as part of the annual budget
process in the Programming, Planning, and Budgeting System
(PPBS), and is thereby reviewed by the Office of Secretary of
Defense (OSD) . If OSD approves the start of the new system
it is included in the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) which
the Secretary of Defense (SoD) uses to submit the budget to
OMB and the President.
The new program is authorized to begin once it is
included in the PDM, but must await Presidential and
Congressional approval by being funded in the approved budget
before it officially starts. Once funds are received and a
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acquisition, work begins on developing a concept, or
concepts, to fulfill the need identified in the JMSNS.
Concept exploration and definition is accomplished by asking
for proposals on systems to meet the need expressed in the
JMSNS from industry and/or government laboratories.
Review of the proposals received and selection of the
competing concepts starts the acquisition process into the
first acquisition process phase. Continuing system
development into the next phase requires the approval of
upper management. In DOD this approval comes from the
Defense System Acquisition Review Committee (DSARC) which is
chaired by the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) and is
composed of other top level people from OSD, and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CRef. 11; pp. 9-10] . This
point in the acquisition process is labeled DSARC Milestone
I. In prior years program initiation and the start of the
Concept Exploration Phase was called Milestone O, but this
milestone terminology is no longer used. The approval
process includes a reevaluation of the need for the system
(Is the threat still valid, and is this the best way to
counter it considering any interim developments?), and a
review of potential costs for the alternatives.
Affordability is a primary consideration. After successfully
passing Milestone I, the next acquisition phase is
Demonstration and Validation (DEM/VAL).
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2. The Demonstration and Validation Phase
After the DSARC and SoD approve continuation of the
system acquisition in Milestone I, the process progresses
into the Demonstration and Validation Phase. In this phase
the remaining competing concepts (the winners from Concept
Exploration) are developed to the point of fully
demonstrating feasibility, and the Logistic Support Analysis
(LSA) process ia considered, although normally not formally
started. Design details are still very open to change, and
the amount of effort required in this stage can vary
considerably between the different competing concepts
depending on the state of development of the technology
invoiVfSd^ At th« end >£" this phase, the system must pass
DSARC Milestone II to proceed on to the next phase. Full
Scale Development (FSD) . At the end of Dem/Val, target
values are set for reliability and maintainability
performance, as well as for performance goals on other
parameters.
3. The Full Scale Development Phase
At DSARC Milestone II the need for the system is
again critically evaluated against current and projected
developments in the environment. Progress in relation to
program schedule and budget projections is also subjected to
critical review. The approval for continuation of the
program comes from the SoD in conjunction with the DSARC.
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After Milestone II the further acquisition cycle
approval of the system is normally transferred to the head of
the Department (e.g.. Secretary of the Navy) as long as the
program stays within guidelines for cost and schedule.
During FSD the formal design of the system starts.
Prototypes are built and (for aircraft programs) competitive
fly-offs are held between the competing designs (two or
more)
.
At the start of this phase (and in some cases in the
preceding phase) the LSA begins with the development of the
Maintenance Concept. It continues in an interactive
iterative mode with the design process to weigh each of the
major Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) elements
(Maintenance Planning, Supply Support, Personnel and
Training, Testing and Support Equipment, Facilities,
Transportation and Handling, Data, and Software CRef . 2; pp.
113 ) and insure that a balanced compromise between
performance, reliability, maintainability, supportabi 1 ity,
and cost is reached in the resultant system design. During
this iterative process LCC analysis plays a major role in the
working out of compromises in the design between the various
logistic and performance alternatives. Target values for
Reliability, Maintainability, and other support related
factors are set at this time if not previously. The LSA
process will be examined in detail in the next section.
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After design and manufacture of the prototype system,
a fly-off is held between the competitors and the final DSARC
Milestone is entered. For DSARC Milestone III the program
again goes through a critical review to verify that the
mission need is still current and valid, that the LCC
estimates are within the bounds of af fordability and budget
projections, and that the schedule is compatible with the
Initial Operational Commitment (IOC) date. The IOC date is
scheduled after DSARC Milestone I as a target for fleet
introduction. This date must be closely coordinated with the
scheduling of all of the logistic support requirements
(trained personnel, spare parts, peculiar support equipment,
etc., should be on site when the new aircraft reaches the
fleet). With the approval of the DSARC and SEC NAV or SoD,
the program passes Milestone III and is ready to proceed to
either pilot production or full-scale production assuming
funding is obtained from the Congress. In some cases the
DSARC leaves the Milestone III review to the designated
Acquisition Authority (e.g., SEC NAV), although this is less
likely with a major aircraft procurement.
4. The Production and Deployment Phase
The next phase in the acquisition process is
Production and Deployment. In this phase production
prototypes are built and full scale production starts. The
production prototype aircraft is tested and evaluated to
verify fleet acceptability and adequate performance either
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concurrently with the initial production effort, or prior to
it (normally concurrently with a less than capacity start of
production) . Producibility is also evaluated here and is the
FSD phase to minimize acquisition costs.
Following successful testing and evaluation, the
aircraft is introduced to the fleet where all (hopefully at
least most) of the logistic support elements are in place to
insure a smooth start up of the system operation (often work
around procedures are required to fill in until all of the
support items are ready)
.
5. Phase Out and Retirement
The final phase of the acquisition process is
Phase-Out and Retirement as the system goes out of service.
This phase can take several forms, but it is not relevant to
operational maintenance requirements and will, therefore, not
be examined further.
C. LOGISTIC SUPPORT ANALYSIS (LSA)
LSA is a subset of Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) and
is initiated with the beginning of the Full Scale Development
(FSD) phase of the acquisition process. LSA is performed in
accordance with MIL-STD-138S-1A [Ref . 15] . LSA looks at the
eight major ILS elements (Maintenance Planning, Supply
Support, Personnel and Training, Test and Support Equipment,
Transportation and Handling, Facilities, Data, and Software)
and attempts to achieve a balance between the various
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logistic elements and system performance parameters (speed,
range, etc.) at an affordable cost. The common factor in the
compromise process of tradeoff analysis is Life Cycle Cost
( LCC) . Each logistic element is examined for an optimum
performance level and then the sensitivity of each element to
the others is examined. This is all done in con3unction with
the design group in an iterative fashion with LCC a major
factor in each tradeoff analysis. Figure 4 [Ref . 14; pp. 12,
Figure 1] illustrates the integrated LSA and maintenance
planning process.
1 . The Maintenance Concept
LSA starts with the development of the Maintenance
Concept. The initial Maintenance Concept is often subject to
numerous changes as the design process progresses, but the
initial cut provides guidance for the beginning portions of
the LSA. The initial Maintenance Concept identifies what
levels of maintenance will perform what functions on the
system. Such things as skill levels required for personnel,
and numbers of personnel at each maintenance level (the three
levels of maintenance for the Navy are Organizational
(squadron). Intermediate, and Depot) are directly resultant
from this decision. Other factors that are impacted by the
Maintenance Concept are kind and amount of test and support
equipment required at each level, number of spares to be
stocked for each level, and so on . Each of the major ILS









































































































































































































1. FEEDBACK LOOPS ARE NOT SHO«M
1 ONLY ONE DEPENDENT VARIABLE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
CAN BE OimMIZEO AT A TIME
1 SUPPORT ELEMENT SOLUTIONS MUST BE DEVELOPED
«. TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED INCLUDE MATRIX ANALYSIS. PARAMETRIC
ANALYSir SIMULATION" SESITIVITY ANALYSIS AND LCC
S. BASED ON COST, COMPLEXITY ANDSUPfORT
DEMAND INCLUDES SE TRAINING EQUIPMENT AND GFE
L PART OF ILS MANAGEMENT PROCESS
* MAINTENANCE PLANNING AND ANALYSIS (MPA) PROCESS
FIGURE 4. INTEGRATED LSA AND MAINTENANCE PLANNING PROCESS (SHEET 2 OF 2)
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developed during the LSA go into the Logistic Support
Analysis Record (LSAR) which provides a common data base for
everyone involved in the process and helps to reduce
confusion
.
2. Preparation of Maintenance Plans
Following the development of the initial Maintenance
Concept the LSA process proceeds to preparation of
Maintenance Plans per MIL-STD-2080A [Ref. 143, supported by a
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FME&CA) per
MIL-STD-1629A CRef. 16]. NAVAIR 00-25-401 [Ref. 17] provides
a guide for maintenance engineers applying these procedures
to Naval aircraft. This process interacts with the design
process iteratively through numerous trade-off and
alternatives studies to minimize LCC without overly
compromising system design parameters. The iterations
between design and LSA work toward the target reliability and
maintainability values. Maintenance plans are prepared for
individual systems, and/or subsystems, and/or components as
the design matures. The initial efforts look at the top
levels of aircraft systems, and as the design matures the
analysis continues down to the component level. During each
stage there is interaction between the designer and the
maintenance analyst.
Preparation of maintenance plans includes an analysis
of Preventive (scheduled) Maintenance and Age Exploration
requirements per MIL-HDBK-266 < AS) [Ref. 7], Corrective
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(unscheduled) Maintenance requirements. Servicing
requirements, and Calibration. Each analysis is broken down
into a Task and Skills Analysis which includes: maintenance
tasks and resources, personnel requirements, training
requirements, support equipment requirements, facilities
requirements, and a Time Line Analysis (Which tasks can be
accomplished concurrently, and which will require separate
access with the associated additional down time?).
Maintenance plans also include Level of Repair (LOR)
analysis per MIL-STD-1390 CRef. 18] to identify
cost-effective level of repair and discard decisions. The
LOR decisions are reflected in the assigned SMS.R (Source,
Maintainability, and Recovery) codes which are eventually
used in service by maintenance personnel to determine what is
to be done with a defective part. The SMS.R code indicates
level of maintenance, level of condemnation (which level
decides whether a repairable component is repairable) , and
whether the item is a repairable or a discard.
The Preventive Maintenance and Age Exploration
requirements developed as subsets of the maintenance plans
use the same data base, the LSAR, as a starting point and
then add to this data base.
Concurrently with the preparation of maintenance
plans the LSA looks at all of the ma3or ILS elements to
achieve a balanced system design from performance,
reliability, maintainability, supportability , and LCC
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standpoints. Since the elements are interrelated, each
change to one must be evaluated for impact on the others.
This cycle is repeated many times as the design matures
toward the target values for performance, reliability, and
maintainability identified at the start of the FSD phase.
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IV. RCM AND SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS
A. RELIABILITY-CENTERED MAINTENANCE
Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) is the logical
analysis technique used to determine scheduled or preventive
maintenance requirements. MIL-HDBK-266 (AS) [Ref . 73
provides procedures for application of RCM logic to Navy
aircraft. RCM is an outgrowth or further development of
MSG-2 and uses inputs from the maintenance plans prepared per
MIL-STD-2080A to determine scheduled (preventive) maintenance
requirements and Age Exploration requirements. These
requirements result from a rigorous analysis logic which has
been refined to a state of giving consistent results
independent of the analyst. The objective of the logic is to
provide a set of fully justified requirements which insure
that the equipment being maintained achieves its inherent
design reliability without wasting resources on unnecessary
tasks. This aim is accomplished via the specified preventive
maintenance tasks (at this stage servicing tasks are
generally included with the preventive tasks) , in conjunction
with Age Exploration tasks designed to provide real data on
those components and systems which were assigned scheduled
tasks through the default side of the logic diagram to insure
a conservative or safe maintenance program. During the
design phase there is steady communication between the
50
maintenance analyst and the designer to modify the design as
necessary to eliminate overly expensive or untimely
maintenance requirements. As data are obtained from service
usage via Age Exploration, the default tasks are either
verified as valid, or can be eliminated or adjusted to longer
intervals based on their service performance.
B. STARTING AN RCM ANALYSIS
The RCM analysis starts with a determination of the
significance of major systems, subsystems, and components
from a safety and maintenance standpoint. Once items are
classified as significant, a review of available data on the
item is conducted. This includes design data, test data, and
any service history data on the components and/or system in
question or on similar components and/or systems. These data
are used in conjunction with the maintenance plans and the
FME6.CA to start the investigation of preventive maintenance
requirements. Figure 5 [Ref . 7; pp. 15, Figure 23
illustrates the overall RCM analysis process. The key factor
in the determination of maintenance requirements is the
failure consequences for the component or system. If the
failure of an item does not have any safety or economic
consequences, it does not warrant a scheduled task. If
failures occur too frequently (low reliability), redesign is
indicated. If the failure of the item has safety
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failure, then a scheduled task is in order, or redesign of
the equipment is called for to eliminate the need for
scheduled maintenance. If a scheduled task cannot be used to
detect impending failure where there are safety consequences,
then redesign is mandatory. If the failure has economic
consequences, it falls into the same category as the safety
item although redesign is desirable rather than mandatory
depending on the magnitude of the economic implications of
failure.
C. HIDDEN FUNCTIONS
The other factor that requires a scheduled task is the
hidden function. If the failure of an item is not evident to
the operating crew in the normal performance of their duties,
a scheduled task or redesign is required. Depending upon the
degree of redundancy in the system, tasks required to monitor
hidden functions may have either long or short intervals.
D. THE RCM LOGIC
Figure 6 [Ref. 7; pp. 17-18, Figure 3] illustrates the
RCM logic. An analyst starts at the top of the diagram and
works downward depending on the answers to each of the
questions. As noted earlier the system is much more powerful
when the design is still fluid and can be readily modified to
eliminate an expensive or unmaintainable feature.
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I IS TKE OCCURENCE OF A FAILURE
EVIOEHT TO THE 0PEBATIM6 CREW
QURINQ PCRFORHANCE OF NORMAL
0UT1ES7
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FIGURE 6. ROM DECISION DIAGRAM (SHEET I OF 2)
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FIGURE 6. RCM DECISION DIAGRAM (SHEET 2 OF 2)
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For each of the questions a conservative default answer
is required if data are inadequate to allow a knowledgeable
response. Because of this feature of the logic process, a
number of scheduled maintenance tasks result from default
answers. However, default answers are subject to critical
scrutiny once further data are available from service usage
via the Age Exploration Program (AEP), and these tasks will
fall out of the program if data become available showing that
they are not valid. The default answer feature insures that
the overall maintenance program is conservative from a safety
standpoint. Figure 7 [Ref . 7; pp. 19, Figure 43 summarizes





Question 1 starts the flow through the decision
diagram by pointing the analyst to either the evident or
hidden function side. This answer, and most of the
succeeding answers, can be reversed by modifications during
the design process. In this way scheduled tasks are
eliminated through redesign of the system if it is cost
effective to do so.
2. Question 2
The answer to Question 2 puts the analyst on the
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3. Question 3
Question 3 directs the analyst to either Question 8
and the operational consequences path, or Question 11 and the
economic consequences path.
4. Question 14
The analyst arrives at Question 14 after a hidden
function answer to Question 1. The questions and answers on
this path are particularly sensitive to design changes.
The ease with which the questions asked on each of these
paths can lead to economic analysis and system redesign
should be noted. Working with the system designer the
maintenance engineer can preclude some unnecessary and
expensive maintenance requirements by suggesting simple
changes to the design. More complicated changes to the
design may require a thorough analysis of all of the
financial (LCC) and operational implications. However, even
if the design isn't changed as a result of the maintenance
engineers input, a record of the perceived problem is
retained and when more data become available the decision may
be reversed or substantiated. The record should preclude the
question being reinvented periodically throughout the life of
the program causing resources to be wasted researching again
all of the factors involved.
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E. PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE TASKS
Preventive maintenance tasks resulting from the RCM
analysis can be one of two basic types: scheduled
inspection, or scheduled removal.
1. Scheduled Inspections
Scheduled inspections may be applicable to any
maintenance level, and are aimed at detecting impending
failures <on-condition) , or failures (failure finding). The
design may or may not lend itself to the detection of
impending failure or wear. Depending upon this, and the
consequence of failure, a redesign may be either desirable or
required.
2. Scheduled Removals
Scheduled removals are of two types: removal for
rework (scheduled rework), or for discard (scheduled
discard) . This is again a result of the design and is
usually driven by the cost of the item and its reliability.
High reliability inexpensive items are usually discarded.
Lower reliability more expensive items may be repaired.
Figure 8 [Obtained from VSE Corporation] illustrates the
decision process used in analyzing a component or system to
determine scheduled maintenance task requirements. The VSE
diagram directly addresses the assessment of risk in the
mainteance analysis process, questions the continuing
maintenance of an item which is not mission essential (such
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establishment of an Age Exploration Program. Figure 9 [Ref
.
7; pp. 21, Figure 53 summarizes the preventive tasks and
their applicability.
F. THE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
Once all signil'icant itemfi are subjected to the analysis
a number of scheduled maintenance tasks result. The final
30b of the analyst for initial maintenance program
determination is to join all of these tasks into groups in a
composite program. The groupings are determined based on the
level of maintenance required to perform the task, and on the
interval determined for the task. Tasks ultimately scheduled
for a given inspection are grouped according to similar
intervals. A task determined to have an optimum 100
flight-hour (FH) interval, and a task determined to have an
optimum 80 FH interval might be grouped together in an 80 FH
phase inspection (an inspection performed every 80 FH) with a
task having a 500 flight-hour optimum interval included in
every sixth phase (there are six phases in the cycle which
starts over again each 480 FH in this example) The resultant
program consists of: organizational level phase inspections
at some flight-hour interval; daily and special inspections
at calendar intervals; removal /discard tasks at flight-hour
or other accumulation of cyclic events (e.g., arrestments) or
calendar intervals; and depot level tasks scheduled for some
SDLM (Standard Depot Level Maintenance) interval, or a
service interval separate from SDLM.
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AEP tasks are included in the maintenance program , and
the data from these tasks are used to modify the maintenance
program as service history is accumulated. AEP tasks
normally carry a requirement to report the results of the
task, especially if a defect is found. Initially Age
Exploration will delete or modify some of the default tasks,
but in the mature program it will serve to monitor most of
the significant maintenance items on a periodic basis to
substantiate the original analysis and provide a basis for
modifying the program as necessary to promote a safe and
economically sound program.
In the case of more modern designs, SDLM may be
eliminated and replaced by a statistical sampling program
tied to Age Exploration looking at relatively small numbers
of aircraft to maintain confidence in the design.
Eliminating SDLM saves large amounts of funds required for
the depot visit of all aircraft of a type/model/series,
reduces the number of aircraft required for the depot
maintenance pipeline, and reduces the number of problems




V. THE F/A-18 MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
A. THE GENERAL PROGRAM
The maintenance program developed for the Navy's newest
fighter/attack aircraft is based on RCM and the instructions
noted in the preceding section, although program initiation
predated the latest revisions of these instructions. The
F/A-18 was designed from the ground up for high reliability
and reduced maintenance. Early results from the operation of
the aircraft indicate that it is going to meet design
objectives in this area.
Table I contains maintenance data for the F/A-18, the
F-14, and the F-4. All of these Navy fighter aircraft have
been subjected to RCM type analyses to optimize their
maintenance programs, and the differences in maintenance
costs for the F/A-IS are illustrative of the benefits of
including front end logistics analysis in the design process.
The F-4 was designed in the late 1950s and was initially
delivered to the fleet in 1961. Later models (F-4J/S) were
redesigned in the mid 1960s to reduce or eliminate some of
the more troublesome features of the original design, but the
design is essentially more than twenty years old.
Supportability requirements did not receive equal
consideration to performance parameters when the F-4 was
64
designed as would be required today, and the high maintenance
man-hour per flight-hour (MMH/FH) values reflect this.
The F-14 was designed in the mid-to-late 1960s and
entered service about 1972 making the design over ten years
old. Supportability was not a major factor in the design of
the F-14, and it is a more complex aircraft than the F-4.
TABLE I
AVERAGE MAINTENANCE MAN-HOURS PER FLIGHT-HOUR
FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1983
F-4S F-14 F/A-18
Organizational Scheduled 19.2 30.6 14.8
Organizational Unscheduled 19.0 19.6 9.1
Intermediate 13.4 11 .7 4.3
TOTALS 51.6 61.9 28.2
Source: NAMSO Report 4790 . A7936 . 1 , Aviation Information
Digest (AID) . January 1984
The F/A-18 maintainability values indicated in Table I
should improve as more aircraft enter service, and the
program reaches maturity. The comparative numbers show
clearly the advantages of front end investment in
reliability, maintainability, and supportability
considerations when designing a new system. The better
maintainability values shown for the F/A-18 are of course
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partially a result of improvements in technology since the
design and manufacture of the older aircraft; however, it is
significant that this does not appear to be the case when
comparing the F-14 and F-4 where there was an advance in
technology, but not as much attention to supportability and
maintainability during the design process.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE
The organizational (0 level) maintenance requirements for
the F/A-18 are similar to those for the older designs
although less demanding. Partially as a result of the design
of the weapon system the number of personnel required in an
F/A-18 squadron of twelve aircraft is 231, instead of the 273
required for an F-4 squadron, and 256 required for the F-14.
Table II breaks out these requirements in more detail.
Intermediate level maintenance is called I level. It should
be noted that the F/A-18 is a single seat aircraft as opposed
to the two seats in the F-4 and F-14, and this is partially
responsible for the lower number of officers in the F/A-IS
squadron
.
1 . Built-in Test Capability
Most of the F/A-18 systems are designed with built-in
teat (BIT) capability to reduce the amount of test and
support equipment required, and to lower the skill levels
required for squadron (operational level) maintenance
personnel. Ready access for maintenance also received more
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consideration than in previous designs reducing corrective






1 Level 181 172 164
Level 27 25 22
DA 27 25 23
TOTALS 273 256 231
Enlisted T
Source: Commander, Naval Air Force Pacific Staff
2. Accessibility Considerations
Good access addresses the ease of reaching a
component for maintenance with little or no disassembly.
High maintainability targets drive the design team to work
hard for good access to meet repair time and component
removal and replacement time goals. The reduction in size of
most electronic components possible with more advanced
technology can be of great help in designing for access.
Another advanced technology factor in the ability to design
for better accessibility is the use of Computer Aided Design
(CAD)
.
CAD is the application of computer graphics to the
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design process. Two and three dimensional graphics were used
in the design of the F/A-18. Northrop engineers have
estimated that World War II vintage aircraft were designed to
about 30 percent density (ratio of filled to empty space
within the airframe) , F-4 vintage aircraft to about 45
percent density, and the F/A-18 to about 70 percent density.
The improvement is a result of using CAD in the design of the
F/A-18. However, one should realize that although CAD allows
the designer to improve accessibility, it also allows him to
pack everything more tightly than was possible previously,
and if accessibility isn't given primary consideration a
truly unmaintainable installation can result.
Organizational level maintenance in many cases consists
of initiating BIT procedures and changing the boxes
indicated. These boxes are called Line Replaceable Units
(LRUs) . The removed LRUs are forwarded to the intermediate
level in most cases, where automatic test equipment
identifies a bad component needing replacement. Some more
complex items are returned to depot level (the manufacturer
under a warranty or Repair of Repairables (ROR) program in
many cases) for maintenance where more sophisticated (and
more expensive) test equipment and more highly skilled
craftsmen can be concentrated more economically (higher
utilization rates are possible in a centralized system).
Part of the maintenance concept for the aircraft systems was
labeled Directly Deployable Maintenance which aimed to keep
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as many LRUs as possible repairable at the O and I levels.
This in turn reduces turn-around-time for repairs, reduces
the quantity of spare assemblies needed in close proximity,
and facilitates long deployments when necessary. In some
cases this was not feasible in the F/A-18 design due to the
cost of the required test equipment (extremely expensive test
gear can only be purchased for a central repair site such as
a depot)
.
The goal of the design effort was an aircraft that would
be much more reliable and easy to maintain than its
predecessors, and it appears that this will be the case. As
in the past, organizational scheduled maintenance
requirements will be published in the NAVAIR -6 series of
Maintenance Requirements Card (MRC) decks.
The Age Exploration Program (AEP) will monitor the
results of organizational maintenance to provide a basis for
any needed modifications to the requirements. Particular
attention will be paid to the default tasks mentioned in
paragraph IV.D above.
C. DEPOT MAINTENANCE (AGE EXPLORATION PROGRAM)
The depot maintenance program for the F/A-18 is presently
called the Age Exploration Program (AEP) (Depot). This title
is appropriate since it is anticipated that there will be no
SDLM for the F/A-18 although this will not be finally decided
until after the first aircraft samples are inspected and
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results analyzed. There are at present no scheduled depot
tasks in the program applicable to all aircraft. Depot
requirements will be published in an annual Maintenance
Requirements Review Board (MRRB) Brochure CRef. 19], and
statistically significant samples of fleet leading aircraft
in particular categories (flight-hours, catapults, low
free-board carrier service, etc.) will be selected for study
each year. It is quite possible that several different
samples of different sizes would overlap at one time in a
given year as items of particular concern are . investigated
.
It is estimated that 6,500 man-hours (MHs) will be required
for each of the first AEP (Depot) aircraft. Table III
provides SDLM NORM values (average MHs planned for a SDLM
visit) for the F-4 and F-14. These NORMS can be compared to
the 6,500 MH scheduled for AEP.
In looking at Table III one should consider that the
20,410 man-hour F-14 SDLM converts to $1,020,500 for each
aircraft at a realistic $50/hour composite depot labor rate.
With a fleet of say 440 aircraft on a 44-month interval, this
results in $122,460,000 for depot maintenance each year. The
$122,460,000 figure can be roughly compared to the $9,100,000
cost of inspecting 28 AEP aircraft per year at 6,500
man-hours each for a fleet of 1,300 aircraft. Of course when
problems are discovered during AEP inspection or by some
other means (fatigue testing, squadron maintenance,
modification lines, crash damage investigation, strain gauge
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data, etc.) additional expense will be added to the
$9,100,000 figure [Ref. 203.
The formal decision on whether the F/A-18 will have a
regularly scheduled SDLM has not been made as yet. This
decision will be officially made after the first 48 aircraft
are inspected via the AEP (Depot) CRef . 20] . The initial
sample size will be 28 aircraft giving a 95 percent
confidence level of finding a defect in the sample if it is





Tour Length (Months)* 48 44 N/A
NORM (Man-Hours)** 13,875 20,410 N/A
Source: * OPNAVINST 3110. IIP
** NARF North Island Production Planning
Department
1 . Sample Sizes
A sampling program apparently places more confidence
in the original design than previously was considered
possible or advisable. The percentage differences in
confidence of finding a defect in either sampling or
wholesale SDLM need not be large, however, if the size of the
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statistical sample is carefully chosen. The large sample
sizes used in previous programs (essentially 100 percent of
the population) were usually based on requirements to look at
certain structural items on a periodic basis with depot skill
level personnel. Current thinking CRef. 21; Appendix B; and
Ref . 22; pp. 13] indicates that samples of 22 aircraft per
year will be adequate to give a 90 percent confidence level
of finding a defect present in the sample if the defective
condition exists in ten percent or more of fleet aircraft.
As noted above the initial sample size will be 28, giving a
95 percent confidence level of finding a defect present in
ten percent of the fleet. These confidence levels assume no
inspection errors, which is highly optimistic. In a major
U.S. Air Force study the probability of finding small cracks
(less than 0.5 inch in length) was found to be as low as 50
percent CRef. 23; pp. 12-2]. However, this information is
balanced by the fact that crack detection capabilities were
considered in the design and analysis of structural
components for the F/A-18 which was not done with older
aircraft. F/A-18 structural components were designed for
four fatigue lifetimes (24,000 spectrum hours) assuming the
presence of an 0.010 inch initial flaw (crack) [Ref. 22; pp.
Al-1]. Critical structural components, those components
whose failures by themselves produce a safety of flight
situation, were subject to additional analysis to identify
where, when, and how to inspect, and what to look for [Ref.
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24; pp. 8] . These requirements give a greater degree of
confidence in the design than was previously possible.
2 . In Support of Statistical Sampling
More exacting design and analysis techniques coupled
with more realistic testing techniques (The original F-4
fatigue test program did not include negative or asymmetric
loads, and landing loads were included in a separate test
program.) have greatly reduced or eliminated the need for
looking at all aircraft. In addition, the F/A-IS has
built-in strain gauges to give a much more accurate picture
of aircraft fatigue life usage than was possible with the
counting accelerometer used on previous aircraft.
Another modern development helping the F/A-18 is the
use of the ACMR (Air Combat Maneuvering Range). The ACMR is
a training device wherein pilots fly their aircraft against
simulated enemy aircraft within the confines of an expansive
range. A version of the range for attack aircraft is planned
in the near future. A data link pod and computer equipment
with recording devices allow pilots to review a simulation of
the fight on a monitor at a later time. The data recorded
during the fight include aircraft altitude, inertial loading,
and speeds. By correlating these data with aircraft
configuration and strain gauge readings, a very real picture
of fatigue damage for different types of usage is obtained,
making the structural life monitoring program for all
aircraft much more accurate than was possible in the past.
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3. Availability of Aircraft for Inspection
A factor that will affect the economic savings and
effectivness of the F/A-18 is the availability of aircraft at
the depot for inspection. Every aircraft already at the
depot for some reason is a potential AEP candidate, and could
save the expense and disruption of bringing an aircraft into
the depot specifically for AEP inspection. In many cases the
aircraft would also be at least partially disassembled for
some other reason, and concurrently performing the AEP
inspection would save man-hours by avoiding duplicate
disassembly. Wm . S. Burlem of NESO North Island has
identified five reasons for inducting an AEP type aircraft
into the depot. The five reasons are summarized below:
<1) Age Exploration--To assess statistically
the material condition of the fleet.
(2) Modification Incorporation--To maintain
air wings in an updated and homogeneous
configuration.
(3) Corrosion Control--To assist the fleet
in containing environmental degradation.
(4) Crash/Battle Damage Repair--To return
damaged aircraft to useful service.
(5) Industrial Capability--To sustain a
viable organic depot baseline.
Burlem noted that the first four of these reasons are
related to aircraft condition, and the last is not. It
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should further be noted that the reasons are mutually
independent, and each is necessary and sufficient by itself
to require an aircraft to be inducted for processing. Giving
thought to scheduling and budgeting possibilities for each of
these reasons leads to the following:
(1) Age Exploration--Schedules are based on
flight-hours, calendar time, or some service
parameter such as arrestments. Budgetary
requirements can be calculated.
(2) Modification Incorporation--Modif ication
schedules are normally connected to air wing
deployment cycles, and occasionally to a flight
safety modification applicable to all aircraft in
a short time frame. Budgetary requirements can
be statistically predicted using historical data.
(3) Corrosion Control--Corrosion control
efforts are often connected to air wing
deployment cycles, and may or may not be
concurrent with modifications. Budgetary
requirements for corrosion control can be
statistically predicted using historical data.
(4) Crash/Battle Damage--Scheduling
requirements are dependent upon operations.
Historical data can be used to statistically
predict budgetary requirements in the event of
combat operations.
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(5) Industrial Capability--A minimum constant
induction rate schedule would be most effective.
Budgetary requirements can be readily calculated
based on the rate chosen.
Based on the above it can be seen that the AEP will
probably not be the primary reason for inducting aircraft
into the depot. It can also be seen that AEP funds can be
saved by closely monitoring all aircraft scheduled to the
depot and selecting AEP candidates from these aircraft when
possible (the required match of aircraft history with the
statistical basis) . Another point that should be noted here
based on the above is that there will still be a requirement
for depot pipeline aircraft with the AEP. Experience will be
needed to determine how much of a reduction in pipeline
assets is possible with AEP.
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VI. U.S. AIR FORCE PROCEDURES
A. OLDER AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS
Older U.S. Air Force (USAF) aircraft are treated very
similarly to those in the Navy with allowances for the
generally less severe operating environment. As an example,
USAF F-4s are very similar to the Navy's, and have similar
scheduled maintenance requirements. With this less modern
structural design, a standard depot maintenance visit for all
aircraft is considered a necessity, and all USAF F-4 models
have a depot interval assigned.
All USAF aircraft were subjected to an Aircraft
Structural Integrity Program (ASIP) CRef . 253 analysis some
years ago < 1970s) to identify structural limits and crack
growth characteristics. These data and operating
requirements were used to determine the type of scheduled
maintenance program possible. With older designs this has
resulted in a scheduled depot requirement in most cases.
B. NEWER AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS
The latest USAF fighter aircraft, the F-15 and F-16, are
maintained via procedures similar to those planned for use on
the F/A-18. Scheduled maintenance requirements are based on
an RCM analysis, and there is no scheduled" depot maintenance
requiring all aircraft to come to the depot on a fixed
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interval. A sample of aircraft is looked at each year to
maintain confidence in the design, and to identify the
material condition of the force (fleet) . The sampling
program is called Analytical Condition Inspection or ACI
.
Most of the sample aircraft are inspected during modification
incorporation to reduce disassembly expense, and to lessen
the impact on the operating community. It is planned to wait
until the F-16 reaches 4,000 flight-hours (half of its
planned life) before inducting the first ACI aircraft [Ref.
26] . Reference 26 notes that USAF operating commands seem to
prefer heavy periodic inspections as opposed to the smaller
phased inspections used by the Navy for most organizational
maintenance.
The F-15 was designed in the late 1960s and introduced
into service around 1974. The F-15 is a large sophisticated
fighter aircraft, but less complicated and sophisticated than
the F-14. The F-16 was designed in the mid-to-late 1970s and
was introduced into service prior to 1980. In comparison to
the F-14 and the F-15 the F-16 is a smaller and less
sophisticated single engine aircraft. The F-16 is also less
sophisticated than the F/A-18. Recent maintenance man-hour
per flight-hour (MMH/FH) values for the F-4E (latest model
USAF F-4 fighter), F-15, and F-16 are given in Table IV.
These data can be compared to those in Table I on page 65.
The values are similar for aircraft designed at approximately
the same time. It is noted that the F-4E is a newer
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structural design that the F-4S and has an internal gun, but
has a less sophisticated missile fire control system. Both
of these F-4 models have leading edge maneuvering slats, the
F-4S via retrofit. The F-4E has a SDLM equivalent
requirement. It is also noted that the F-16 is a more mature
program than the F/A-18 which produces lower MMH/FH values.
The single engine of the F-16 also serves to reduce field
level (I level) MMH/FH.
TABLE IV
AVERAGE MAINTENANCE MAN-HOURS PER FLIGHT-HOUR
FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1983
F-4D F-15A/B F-16A
onal 49.1 44.9 24.4
evel) 13.0 14.9 7.3
TOTALS 62.2 59.8 31.7
Source: Logistics Operations Center, Air Force
Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Ohio
2,002 depot man-hours are scheduled for each F-15 ACI in
1984. These hours include disassembly, inspection,
reassembly and check out, and 400 MMHs for correction of
defects CRef. 273. The F-16 is not scheduled for ACI until
1987 or 1988 when the force leading aircraft will have
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accumulated 4,000 flight hours. This information can be
compared to the data in Table III on page 71. The comparison
confirms that a mature ACI program such as that of the F-15
can be enormously less expensive than an ongoing SDLM program
such as that for the F-14. The F-15 also has a good safety
record. The relatively small number of man-hours for the
F-15 ACI compared to the initial F/A-18 AEP estimate (2,002
versus 6,500) gives hope that the mature AEP for the F/A-18
will be significantly less expensive than 6,500 man-hours per
aircraft. The lack of an ACI requirement for the F-16 until
after it reaches 4,000 flight-hours (until recently an
advanced age for a fighter aircraft) shows considerable
confidence in the analyses supporting the design and the
maintenance program.
C. PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
The governing instructions for depot inspection of USAF
aircraft CRefs. 28, 29, 30, and 31] are similar in concept to
what the Navy is doing with RCM and the Age Exploration
Program (AEP). The sample sizes used in the USAF program are
smaller than those planned for use with the F/A-18, and give
a lower level of confidence for finding a defect. The basis
for the sample size is a double sampling program, which
starts with a sample of 11 aircraft from a fleet of 200 or
more aircraft, and requires a second sample of 13 additional
aircraft if a defect is found in the first sample. This
SO
program is intended to detect any defect existing in 20 or
more percent of the fleet with a 90 percent probability CRef
.
29; pp. 2] . If more than one defect is found in the first
sample, or if an additional defect is found during a required
second inspection, it is assumed that the defect is present
in 20 percent or more of the fleet and corrective action is
initiated accordingly.
D. BASIS FOR THE PROGRAM
Discussions with cognizant USAF personnel revealed that
the sampling requirements were designed some time ago and the
detailed basis for the confidence levels chosen is not
available today. AFLC Regulation 66-28 notes [Ref. 29; pp.
2] that,
"The sample size and selection criteria
specified do not constitute a statistically valid
sample of the MDS population according to the
statistical probability theory. However, they do
provide the most practical sampling of the worst
case aircraft to give the SM early indicators of
the force airworthiness to determine the need for
additional maintenance requirements or
modifications. '*
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VII. POTENTIAL AEP PROBLEMS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH AGE EXPLORATION (AEP)
By looking backwards to the multifaceted analysis that
leads up to the AEP, it is clear that the program is backed
by considerable data. In comparison to previous design
efforts leading to an aircraft with a scheduled maintenance
program, there was a significant increase in the amount of
attention given to individual failure consequences and
maintenance requirements; however, just as in the past there
is a chance of error or omission resulting in an
unanticipated problem with the design. This chance or
probability is much lower today considering the depth and
breadth of the required analysis going into the final design
and maintenance program, but considering the complexity of
the systems involved it is a virtual certainty that there
will be unanticipated problems with the new aircraft. This
leaves the question of how an AEP-based maintenance program
will handle these problems in comparison to the previous
system where all aircraft were subjected to depot level
inspection on some scheduled interval <SDLM)
.
Most individuals with experience in the maintenance of
aircraft realize that the majority of problems (structural
failures, flight control problems, electrical problems, etc.)
have been found in the past more as a result of accident than
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design. This doesn't say that the inspections required on
older aircraft did not serve a purpose in many cases, only
that there were a significant number of problems occurring
that were not anticipated. Inspections currently required on
older designs have been justified by an RCM type analysis and
are valid for the design in question.
A plus for the old system (SDLli) was that more looking
was going on so there was more of a chance of finding
something, even if the discovery was inadvertent. On the
negative side, the more disassembly that is done the more
likelihood there is of creating a problem in doing the
reassembly, and disassembling every aircraft is expensive and
difficult to control from a cost standpoint (the larger the
task the more difficult it is to control).
In the past the discovery of a new problem would require
engineering investigation to determine the nature of the
problem and what could or should be done to correct it.
Prior to the development of MSG-1, MSG-2, and RCM, the
investigative process was more difficult due to the lack of a
comprehensive breakdown of all of the aircraft's systems and
structure along with failure consequences. With the addition
of this informational base and improved techniques of
structural analysis, investigations of future problems should
lead to better solutions in less time whatever the nature of
the problem. A disadvantage compared to the current SDLM
environment is the potential lack of ready access to
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additional aircraft to rapidly expand the data base. The
lack of available aircraft will create difficulties for fleet
operators and engineering investigators unless there are
modification lines handy at the depot or field activity so
that downing and disassembling an aircraft of the required
configuration and background will not be necessary.
The aircraft custodians (Commanders, Naval Air Forces,
Pacific and Atlantic) and the depot will have to be more
flexible under the AEP maintenance concept than has been
required under the SDLM concept. There will be cases where
one or more aircraft will have to be pulled out of service on
short notice for an inspection to verify the extent and/or
nature of a problem. This requirement is similar to current
urgent action Airframe Bulletin (AFB) procedures, except that
aircraft for an initial AFB look have usually been available
at the depot and fleet operations are not disturbed until
inspection procedures are prepared if a general inspection is
necessary. The potential requirement to rapidly deploy depot
inspection teams when a defect is found during and AEP
inspection carries with it the problem of obtaining the
associated funding to conduct needed inspections and/or
repairs. This potential funding problem is recognized and
addressed in reference 20, and efforts to identify funding
procedures are in progress.
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B. QUALITY OF THE DATA
The paramount issue with the AEP concept is the ability
to gather good data. A statistical sampling program is of
little value if valid data are not collected accurately. To
insure valid and accurate data it is planned that engineering
personnel will be used to record the results of AEP (Depot)
inspections. In this way all defects found can be classified
accurately as to their significance, and an accurate record
maintained for future trend analysis. This requirement will
necessitate a dedicated group of engineering personnel within
the NESO (NAVAIR Engineering Support Office) at the rework
activity to carry out this function. Contracted engineering
support during particularly heavy surges of data gathering
and/or analysis is feasible [Ref. 21; pp. 1-93.
Accuracy of data is also a major concern for the
remainder of the AEP (non depot) . Timely and accurate data
will allow valid decisions on modifications to the initial
scheduled maintenance program, particularly in terms of the
tasks resulting from default decisions during the RCM
analysis process (see paragraph IV. D). The NESO will need to
work closely with the aircraft operators to insure a sound
data base for task modification decisions.
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C. PRIMARY RELIABILITY-CENTERED MAINTENANCE WEAKNESS
The most obvious weakness in the RCM analysis process
CRef . 7] is in the procedures used to determine the initial
inspection thresholds. This part of the process is subject
to individual interpretation, and two analysts of similar
skill level could arrive at different intervals after
analyzing the same item. Improvement in the system is
needed, and until it occurs, the AEP is especially important.
In the early stages of a program the AEP can insure that
service intervals are driven outward to the maximum extent
possible (the inherent reliability level of the equipment).
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF NON-DESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION
Effective non-destructive inspection (NDI) is essential
to insure the quality of data. The success of the sampling
inspection is closely tied to the quality of the NDI program.
In light of demonstrated problems in this area in the past
CRef. 23] much attention to this area is required. As noted
previously, the confidence levels expressed for the sampling
plans assume a perfect inspection process. Successful defect
detection rates as low as fifty percent have been realized in
some cases ClbidD . Continued improvement in this area can
pay big dividends in terms of a higher success rate for
inspections, and in terms of fewer inspection man-hours and
shorter turnaround times. Large area inspection techniques
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for composite structures is an NDI field that holds
particular promise.
E. AEP (DEPOT) RELATIVE TO THE AIR FORCE SYSTEM
The primary difference between the USAF Analytical
Condition Investigation (ACI) program for the F-15 fighter
and the AEP (Depot) program for the Navy F/A-18 is the sample
size and statistical basis used. The USAF has settled on a
90 percent confidence level of finding a defect that exists
in 20 or more percent of the force (fleet for Navy). This
results in a first sample size of 11 aircraft for a force of
200 or more aircraft based on a double sampling program. In
double sampling a second sample is required if a defect is
found in the first sample. The size of the second sample in
this case is 13 additional aircraft CRef. 29; pp 21.
The F/A-18 AEP (Depot) is starting with a sample size of
28 aircraft giving a 95 percent confidence level that a
defect which exists in 10 percent or more of the fleet will
be detected. The Navy approach is obviously more cautious,
and stands less of a chance of being surprised by a ma^or
problem which could adversely impact fleet readiness. If a
problem that impacts 20 percent or more of the fleet is not
found until it has grown to more than 20 percent, a large
safety, operational readiness, and financial problem is at
the doorstep of the custodian. A larger sample size and
confidence level reduces the risk significantly while still
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retaining a considerable cost savings over SDLM. As
experience is gained the validity of a given sample size may
prove questionable, but the basis process will continue with
larger or smaller samples used.
F. ARE THE ACQUISITION PROCEDURES WORTH THE EFFORT?
One could question the worth of the complex procedures
used to acquire a new weapon system with respect to the cost
in time more than in dollars. With life cycle cost analysis
and attention to all of the maintainabiility and
supportability items (LSA), the dollar cost of the procedures
is hard to question. The delay time between the initial need
and the first deployment is, however, something that is more
vulnerable to questioning. Major acquisitions can take one
to four years for each of the acquisition phases, and ten
years or more from approval of the need by OSD to initial
deployment is quite possible. Acquisition in half as much
time was possible under the procedures that produced the F-4,
although procurement costs could get out of control more
easily in that system, and the less thoroughly tested and
developed system might be too expensive to maintain at an
acceptable level of readiness. The aircraft received as a
result of the delay associated with the new acquisition
process should be significantly better in terms of the much
lower cost of ownership (acquisition and operation), should
be more reliable and easier to maintain, and should be able
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to perform its mission at least as well. The thrust of
developments in the acquisition field is aimed at improving
the system in terms of reducing the time required to obtain a
new system. Hopefully, efforts in this direction will lead
to a capability to acquire affordable, capable, and
supportable weapon systems in a more timely manner.
G. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS
Reviewing the background of the development of the
scheduled maintenance requirements determination process
reveals rapid growth with many changes over a relatively
short timeframe, and the likelihood of more change and growth
in the future. Present and future aircraft design programs
will continue to emphasize reduction of maintenance
requirements and life cycle cost as goals worthy of equal
weight with performance specifications.
The probable increased length of the life cycle for newer
weapon systems greatly increases the potential life cycle
cost savings from reduced operating and maintenance costs.
The increasing scarcity of funding for aircraft maintenance
evident over the past decade will probably continue in the
future. This makes the AEP or some type of sampling based
inspection program an economic necessity for the future.
With careful consideration of this requirement in the design
process, and a thorough and thoughtful development of the
maintenance program inspection requirements, future aircraft
89
operations should be at least as safe as in the past, and
availability should be improved. This safe operation should
be accomplished at considerable savings in funding required
for maintenance man-hours and pipeline aircraft. Reductions
in depot staffing is also a probable coat saving result as
older aircraft are phased out and SDLM requirements are no
longer present. The build-up of experience with the F/A-IS
AEP will provide needed data on the exact magnitude of this
potentially large saving.
With experience gained in the F/A-18 AEP, further
improvements to the current system of developing scheduled
maintenance programs should be possible, and this will aid
the design of the next weapon system. This potential benefit
is another reason that particular care must be taken in the
implementation of the F/A-18 AEP to document procedures used
and decisions made.
With advancing technology, significant additional
reductions in the cost of maintenance for future aircraft
should be possible. As an example, the USAF is citing eight
to ten MMH/FH as a target for the ATF (Advanced Tactical
Fighter) program which is at the end of the Concept
Exploration Phase in the acquisition process at this time.
Maintenance man-hour expenditures in this range, coupled with
reduced requirements for maintenance personnel and test and
support equipment, and with no requirement for scheduled
depot maintenance will result in a weapon system that is
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orders of magnitude less expensive to maintain and operate
than is the case with older designs. A recent article on
fighter design requirements of the future [Ref. 323 by an
aircraft designer emphasized the above points in analyzing
the key contributors to success in the last four major
conflicts involving U.S. versus Soviet aircraft (Korea in
1951-53, Southeast Asia in 1962-73, the Middle East in the
Yom Kippur War in 1973, and the Bekka Valley campaign in
1982) . The article stresses the need for a balance between
performance capabilities and number of aircraft. The author
notes that without this balance, too few of an aircraft with
tremendous performance capability, but which is too expensive
to own and operate in adequate quantities, is as bad a
situation as having large numbers of comparatively low
performance easy targets. The article goes on to say:
".... In the future, technology needs to reflect
this balance, particularly in the following
areas
:
AFFORDABILITY. Most customers for fighters
are required to buy the system lowest in cost
that still meets their requirements.
Technological leverage must not only improve
performance but also prove cost-effective
AVAILABILITY. In its broadest definition,
availability means airplanes on target when and
where required. Examples of the importance of
availability have been provided by the Israelis
in their last two encounters. High sortie rate
turned overall numerical inferiority into local
numerical superiority. The next fighter should
be designed for high reliability,
maintainability, and supportabi lity . . . .
"
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The article notes that it is perhaps easier to say the
words than to meet this challenge, but that the effort is
necessary to obtain the weapon systems needed. The last
three sentences in this quote highlight the fact that reduced
maintenance requirements combined with improved reliability
and maintainability not only reduce life cycle cost, but they
also act as a force multiplier. This is particularly
important in carrier operations since numerical inferiority
is a strong possibility.
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